Factions, feuds and noble power in the lordship of Ireland, c. 1356 Ireland, c. -1496 O n 17 September 1496 Gerald, eighth earl of Kildare (the 'Great Earl'), landed at Howth, County Dublin, after a lengthy and troubled voyage from England. One of the earl's fellow travellers gave thanks to God for his safe arrival.
1 If Kildare did likewise, his gratitude probably sprang less from his delivery from the natural elements than from his survival of a hostile political climate at court. Since the battle of Bosworth in 1485 not one but two Yorkist pretenders had found support in Ireland. The first of them -Lambert Simnelwas crowned in May 1487 as 'King Edward VI' in Christ Church cathedral, Dublin, after which a parliament was held in his name. Kildare was chief governor of Ireland during both conspiracies. More recently he had faced allegations of treason during the expedition of Sir Edward Poynings (1494-5). 2 Despite this dubious record of loyalty to the newly established Tudor dynasty, on 6 August 1496 Henry VII appointed the Great Earl lord deputy of Ireland.
The appointment was a sign of the king's trust, but it was a trust qualified by the fear that at Kildare's return Ireland would sink once again into a mire of factional strife. For the past four decades the Geraldine earls of Kildare and the Butler earls of Ormond had coexisted in a rancorous relationship. 3 The Butlers had been the dominant, though not unchallenged, resident English nobles in Ireland since the mid-fourteenth century, and they refused to give way gracefully to the power that the earls of Kildare had exercised since the 1450s. As recently as 1492-3 there had been skirmishes on the streets of Dublin, and Geraldine adherents had killed a former mayor of the city on Oxmantown Green. 4 Kildare's reappointment in 1496 was, therefore, made provisional on the cessation of the Geraldine-Butler feud. A peace pact drawn up between the two parties begins by describing the 'grete and haynoux discord discencion and variaunce that have be betwix thies [two] noble blodes of the land of Ireland called Botellers and Geraldynes'. Both parties were ordered to 'frely forgeve … alle maner of Rancore, malices, slaunders, evill willes, discordes, discencions, robbories, brennynges, Iniuries, mayms, manslaughters' and all manner of offences perpetrated by their enemies. Rather than revenging themselves for past wrongs, the two earls promised to be 'loving, amyable, frendly and concordable '. 5 If the intention behind this verbose pact was to bring a permanent end to the strife between the houses of Ormond and Kildare, it was a resounding failure. Their rivalry persisted well into the next century. But the year 1496, standing on the border between the periods that are labelled, perhaps unhelpfully, 'medieval' and 'modern', provides a useful date to pause and take stock of that yawning lacuna in Irish historiography -the late middle ages. The Geraldine-Butler antagonism is merely the most notorious episode in an extended series of conflicts between the English residents of Ireland. This seemingly endemic disorder has not endeared the later medieval colony to historians. The few who have ventured into the period have been markedly unsympathetic to the actors in these conflicts, bemoaning the decline of royal power that promised impartial justice and attributing the nobility's feuding to the entrenchment of local lordship. It is possible to see things otherwise. A wider perspective has proved highly instructive for specialists studying other aspects of Irish history. Robin Frame, for the period up to and beyond the watershed of 1361, 6 and Steven Ellis from the late Yorkist era, 7 have emphasised the resilience of English government and the potential of local lordship to provide stability amid the challenges of the marcher environment of Ireland. Unfortunately, despite occasional prompting, 8 
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Reprinted much of the writing on Ireland in the intermediary period springs from an oldergreat lineages proliferated, landless idlemen were a notorious source of disorder. 15 Yet the hazards did not necessarily diminish with closeness to Dublin, which witnessed its own share of discord, 16 while the population of nearby Meath -neither dominated by magnates nor encumbered with lineages -was well versed in the pastimes of a wrangling gentry, such as petty sieges, forcible entry, abduction and extortion. 17 Permeating, amplifying and occasionally retrospectively justifying many of these disputes were cultural tensions between the English 'by birth' and the English 'by blood', a distinction that became increasingly defined during this period. 18 Such variegation makes all general comment perilous. Each individual quarrel can be seen as the sum of plural disputes, most of whose details are tantalisingly denied to us. Yet it is still possible to detect some broad patterns. If we arbitrarily designate the century and a half before 1496 as the 'late middle ages', then at least three distinct waves of upheaval involving the comital houses of Ireland can be discerned within this period. Between the 1340s and the early fifteenth century, discordant relations between the earls of Desmond and Ormond gradually escalated into a series of depredations that resulted in high-profile casualties on both sides. 19 In the first half of the fifteenth century James, fourth earl of Ormond (the 'White Earl'), was engaged in another protracted struggle, this time with the Talbot family, co-heirs to the lordship of Wexford and later earls of Shrewsbury and Waterford. 20 Three years after the White Earl died in These disputes were not trivial. They penetrated the collective memory of the colonists, whether in manorial records and local petitions, 22 or the battle rolls of bardic poems composed for marcher lords. A late fifteenth-century elegy records how Philip Hackett deflected an attack on the town of Fethard, County Tipperary, launched by the earl of Desmond, possibly in 1462:
Philip's fame was noised abroad when the Earl was before Fethard; He stopped at the ford of the town and gave way to none.
23
Clearly the lordship of Ireland in the later middle ages was a disturbed land. Why this was so is problematic, but hardly a new question. Stock answers had already been supplied by the earliest historian of the English in Ireland, Gerald de Barri (Gerald of Wales), who deplored the fact that the vices of the Gaelic Irish -which, importantly for this discussion, included treachery and a lust for vengeance -'contaminated' the invaders of Ireland. 24 Many early modern observers adopted this conceit of the Gaelic lifestyle as a contagion that spread 26 Worse, the English nobles of Ireland increasingly adopted the manners and customs of the Gaelic Irish in the centuries after the invasion. These lords 'loving the Irish tyranny', to quote Davies again, cast off the laws of England. 27 The passage of centuries had scarcely advanced Gerald's analysis; nor was this coincidence, since early modern writers shared a wish to justify the drastic measures required to introduce English government to Ireland. 28 The argument from factionalism, then, can lay claim to a long pedigree, and survived as an important theme in a broad spectrum of twentieth-century literature. Typically, blame has been apportioned to a weak central government and 'overmighty' lords. As the central administration became weaker, turbulent magnates arrogated power to themselves and indulged in private war to further territorial pretensions. This 'relapse of politics into mere faction' acted, in the words of one historian, as 'an agency in the breakdown of medieval Anglo- 430 
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Reprinted Ireland ' . 29 Not that 'Anglo-Ireland' was necessarily marked out for particular opprobrium. Some historians who laboured on Irish material pointed out defensively that the 'embitterment of faction' in Ireland merely reflected 'all the evils which existed for other reasons in England at the same period'. 30 This whiff of Whiggery is redolent of Stubbs, who portrayed the fifteenth century in England as 'a worn-out helpless age, that calls for pity without sympathy, and yet balances weariness with something like regrets'. 31 If the constitutional framework was that of Stubbs, it was another historian, Charles Plummer, who in 1885 distilled the interpretation into a convenient and evocative term: 'bastard feudalism'.
32
In various incarnations, this construct -which, in its rudiments, denotes a social bond between lord and man based on money payments rather than land tenure -has been integral to over a century of debate on late medieval society. Of course, the discussion has long since progressed beyond the original, explicitly negative, connotation intended by Plummer. Instrumental was the work of K. B. McFarlane, whose seminal article of 1944 seeking to legitimise 'bastard feudalism' was one stage in a thorough rehabilitation of the medieval nobility. 33 McFarlane dispatched the idea of ' "overmighty subjects", [who were] if not factious then feeble' with the sardonic comment: 'How fortunate that they killed each other off in the Wars of the Roses and that the Tudors decapitated the survivors!' 34 Rather, he considered that the conflicts between crown and nobility were 'almost always the fault of the king; which is as much as to say that it depended how often the hereditary succession brought those unfit to rule to the throne'. 35 In the succeeding half-century the study of late medieval England, in particular the role of the nobility, has been refined. The chronology of 'bastard feudalism' has been pushed ever further backwards and it has been shown to have 29 Griffith, 'Talbot-Ormond struggle', pp 376, 390. 30 Otway-Ruthven, Med. Ire., p. 376. Margaret Griffith also notes the 'parallelism which can often be observed between English and Anglo-Irish history' and comments sadly on the destruction of English 'constitutional machinery' in Ireland ('Talbot-Ormond struggle', p. 376). 31 William Stubbs, The constitutional history of England in its origins and development (3rd ed., 3 vols, Oxford, 1883-4), iii, 637. Note also his comment that the 'All that was good and great in [medieval life] was languishing even to death … The sun of the Plantagenets went down in clouds and thick darkness; the coming of the Tudors gave as yet no promise of light; it was "as the morning spread upon the mountains", darkest before dawn' (ibid., p. 631). 32 coexisted happily with 'feudal' lordship; 36 attention has shifted from noble affinities to the gentry and county communities; 37 and there have recently been calls for a return to a constitutional approach or to studies of the 'politics of government'. 38 But in fundamental respects, notably the depiction of the nobility as an essential partner in the governance of the realm, McFarlane's achievement has endured. 39 To a remarkable extent, large tracts of late medieval Irish history have remained isolated from these developments. This was partly due to chance. The formidable scholars who in the mid-twentieth century interested themselves in the history of medieval Ireland were precisely those most resistant to McFarlane's reappraisals. 40 True, their focus was not the Stubbsian 'constitution' so much as administrative and institutional history. Richardson and Sayles, whose herculean researches provided such a wealth of insights into the colony's institutions, were determined iconoclasts of the cult of Stubbs. 41 Even so, they shared his centralist presuppositions (which -to borrow the words of Rees Davies -were 'all the stronger for being unspoken and unexamined'), 42 and attributed the 'spirit of strife' in fifteenth-century Ireland to the 'mal du siècle that afflicted so many lands and so many great men'. 43 Another influence was Helen M. Cam. When Cam paid an 'historical revisit' to Stubbs after seventy years, she was impressed by his 'vital and magnificent achievement', 44 and herself described the social order of the later middle ages as 'parasitic … and far removed indeed from the atmosphere of responsibility, loyalty and faith which 432 Irish Historical Studies had characterised the relationship of lord and vassal in the earlier middle ages'.
45
It was Cam who supervised the early research of the doyenne of Irish medievalists, Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven, at Cambridge. 46 This piece of academic genealogy helps to explain Otway-Ruthven's rather unsympathetic treatment of the late middle ages in Ireland. A chapter of her magnum opus (which remains indispensable for the period 1361-1496) is entitled 'Lancastrian Ireland: the growth of faction'.
47
Of course, we must not indulge in caricature: both before and after McFarlane the stress in Irish historiography has been placed elsewhere. The writings of Edmund Curtis, for instance, speak glowingly in terms of 'aristocratic home rule' and the Anglo-Irish 'patriot party'.
48 Yet Curtis's apprenticeship in the rigorous school of constitutional history at Oxford occasionally betrays him, as when he bewails 'the evils of rampant feudalism' that threatened 'good government and prosperity to the people'.
49 James Lydon embodies a similar ambivalence.
50
Although he notes that 'the growth of lordship did not mean a degeneration into anarchy', he has reiterated that ' "bastard feudalism" … was a menace to the rule of law' 51 and writes disapprovingly of 'the power of the independent feudatories and their complete disregard for a feudal code of behaviour that now clearly belonged to a dying world … The growth of faction … [was] symptomatic of the If Curtis, Otway-Ruthven and Lydon were the opinion-formers in the Irish historiography, more recent writers have followed their lead. There is a grudging acceptance that the cash-starved administration found it expedient to '[bow] to realities' and delegate power to the colony's nobility, who could, 'faute de mieux', provide some stability in the localities. 53 But the positive potential of such arrangements was undermined by the 'evils inherent in the development of lordship'; entrusting the colonial nobility with office led to a 'dangerous reliance upon personal interests in government'. 54 The nobles were 'not entirely reliable [and] pursued their own internecine quarrels and private wars'. 55 J. A. Watt probably spoke for many historians when he wrote that in the late fourteenth century the 'colonial government entered a particularly drab phase of its history, with a dreary succession of ineffectual heads … [who] were as unable to ward off the hostile Gaelic Irish as to suppress Anglo-Irish marauding and the debilitating feuds among the magnates, of which that between Ormond and Desmond is the most scandalous'.
56 By the mid-fifteenth century the situation seemingly had further deteriorated, and 'unruly' lords posed a 'serious threat to domestic order, and English rule itself'. 57 Indeed, 'the substantial obstacles in Ireland to practical control from Westminster and the king's court threatened to convert such magnate dominance into something worse than lawlessness -tyranny'. 58 It is 434 
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Reprinted scarcely surprising, given the currency of such views in standard works, to find early modernists depicting 'lordship' in late medieval Ireland as a dubious legacy and emphasising its antediluvian character with the epithets 'feudal' or 'bastard feudal', often employed interchangeably and in a pejorative sense. 59 It must be conceded that contemporary documentation can be readily mobilised to establish the existence of these tyrannous and fissiparous magnates. One example, from 1399, must suffice: 'McMurghe [the king of Leinster] is at open war, and he is now gone to Dessemond to aid the Earl of Dessemond to destroy the Earl of Ormond, if they can; and afterwards to return, with all the power that they can get from the parts of Munster, to destroy the country.' 60 Yet the evidence, however damning, gives rise to many questions, not least whether we are the 'conceptual prisoners' 61 of our sources. From the late fourteenth century the reassuring sequence of important administrative records -for instance, the memoranda rolls and audited accounts of the Irish exchequer -falters, while grievance-laden petitions, ministerial reports, parliamentary and conciliar proceedings and personal correspondence survive in greater quantities, providing an all-too-convenient repository for lurid descriptions of governmental disarray and magnate 'tyranny'. Yet there is no provable correlation between the volume of complaint and the level of disruption; vocal disapproval may indeed indicate higher expectations of public order. 62 Moreover, the basic assumption that royal justice was a force for order cries out for interrogation. On the contrary, Michael Clanchy has suggested that arguably 'royal power contributed to disorder and that the judicial authority of the crown was a public nuisance'. 63 This may explain why it is so unconvincing to relate inversely the potency of the central administration to the intensity of private war. In the 1290s, with royal power at its zenith, Ireland witnessed factional disturbances, and, in the first surviving parliamentary records of 1297, the colonial community remonstrated about the level of disorder. 64 The baby to be snatched from the outrush of Stubbsian bathwater is the fact that the colony's experience was not unique. Attributing factions and feuds in Ireland to the problem of 'degeneracy' can become almost reflexive, 65 so it is salutary to be reminded that the colony was not the only territory in the condominium of Plantagenet lands where feuds were common. In Gascony the authorities struggled with the nobility's claim to be entitled to wage private warfare, and the prolonged feud between the houses of Foix and Armagnac is reminiscent of the Geraldine-Butler conflict in Ireland. 66 Within Britain too vendetta was very much alive. Across Scotland the bloodfeud survived with royal support long into the early modern period, 67 while in Wales private war was a commonplace, protected in the law of the march and owing much to both the native Welsh bloodfeud, or galanas, and feudal notions of justice, among them 'one of the best-known features of continental feudalism, the eventual resort to private warfare for the settlement of disputes'. 68 England likewise suffered from disorder. The problem seems to have been particularly acute in the first half of the fourteenth century, when outlaws were reportedly terrorising the countryside, notably Derbyshire and Leicestershire, and were employed by respectable landholders and churchmen to carry out their more sordid business. The members of such gangs fled their natural habitats on being declared criminals and banded together because survival outside the law was better assured in groups than alone. 69 It was a similar process in Ireland that lay behind the banding together of English felons of Ireland and native Irish 'enemies' who lived by plundering the colonists. 70 Indeed, the connexion between the two was sometimes even more direct. In 1373 one John Power of Ireland, a clerk, was known to be operating in Gloucestershire with a band of English criminals described as 'common thieves and murderers and armed riders in the land of peace'. 71 It is also important to recall that feuds were not uncommon between English magnates 72 and that, from the Appellant crisis of 1387-8 to the Wars of the Roses, England was periodically embroiled in armed conflict. 73 This was in spite of the fact that nobles in England, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, could not claim the right to resort to private arms to resolve their conflicts. Although Paul Hyams has demonstrated that the feudwhich had been an important feature of Anglo-Saxon society -suffered a slower and more painful death in post-Conquest England than had previously been assumed, it remains true that the knell was sounded by the expansion of royal justice and a burgeoning common law. 74 
II
The lordship of Ireland, as we are often reminded, was born amid these developments. 75 Consequently, no one in Ireland could assert a traditional right to prosecute feuds, a droit de guerre. Nonetheless, private war was a reality. Notwithstanding repeated attempts to suppress it, 76 march law, in an Irish idiom, was woven into the social fabric of the colony. It seems unlikely that combatants pondered long over whether the origins of their extra-legal actions lay in the remnants of feudal custom or were borrowings from Gaelic neighbours. March law was not codified and probably served as an umbrella term for many types of action outside the common law. 77 What is certain is that recourse to self-help was one of its tenets. In 1351 an ordinance stipulated that 'if strife [should] arise between English and English, being of the peace, neither of them [should] make distraint or take pledge or distress upon the other, nor take vengeance against the other' but instead they should follow common-law procedures. Such 'distresses' are described a few years later as being 'according to the law of the march'. 78 If Ireland's experience of private conflict bears general comparison to that of other lands, then it seems sensible to consider in an Irish context the more balanced approach to the late medieval nobility that has been adopted by scholars elsewhere. Any such exercise has its pitfalls, primarily a tendency to homogenise highly disparate circumstances. The peculiarities of Irish terrain, familiar as they are, should not be forgotten. Modulations in the intensity of English settlement, political fragmentation, a deeply institutionalised ethnic divide, the habitual absenteeism of the king, and the lack of an alternative focus for colonial loyalties: each of these individual ingredients has its counterpart elsewhere; but combined, their flavour is quite distinctly that of colonial Ireland. A second, and more fundamental, problem is presented by the concept of 'bastard feudalism'. It would be rash to encumber Irish historiography with another abstraction at precisely the moment when scholars elsewhere are removing their 'feudal' and 'bastard feudal' spectacles. 79 It may be better to abandon the qualifiers and speak merely of 'lordship' (dominium), a subtle and versatile term that has been proposed as a solution to more than one terminological difficulty. 80 Yet if 'bastard 438 
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feudalism' has the potential to act as a conceptual nuisance, it can still serve as a signpost directing us towards studies of the diplomatics and mechanics of noble power outside Ireland. These matters deserve comprehensive treatment in their own right, but even a brisk review should demonstrate their relevance to the exercise of 'lordship' within the colony, albeit at the cost of dwelling initially on two of the 'bastard feudal' symptoms that once made scholars so suspicious of aristocratic power: noble affinities organised, in part, on the basis of written contracts; and livery and maintenance. Despite laws stipulating that only the king or his representative could wage war in the lordship of Ireland, 81 it seems that most lords operating on Irish marches maintained a private retinue that could be absorbed into the forces of nobles higher up the aristocratic ladder, creating ever larger confederacies. The most important focuses of such military support were the three earls of Desmond, Ormond and Kildare, who, in turn, occasionally entered the service of the senior (though, from 1333, seldom resident) member of the aristocratic élite, the earl of Ulster. Written agreements survive stipulating the mutual obligations of lords and their retainers, whether English or Gaelic. 82 The earliest extant examples date from the late thirteenth century, 83 and from the fourteenth century indentures of retinue, the classic feature of 'bastard feudalism', survive to shed light on the military arrangements of each of the Irish earls. 84 The service due to them could be onerous. In an indenture of retinue from 1356 Oliver Howell promised to serve the second earl of Ormond for life throughout Ireland in both peace and war with his own retinue -which included four men-at-arms with fully armoured 85 and forty footmen known as kern 86 -in return for the lump sum of one hundred marks of silver. 87 As elsewhere, the number of surviving indentures is far from overwhelming, and they can only have been one -and not the most common -element of lordship. 88 Besides those who were formally retained, the earls clearly commanded the support of large networks of 'frendes allyes servantes adherentes and party takers' 89 that bear comparison to the affinities of English and Scottish magnates. 90 Through these clients, they held sway over enormous territories that far exceeded their own landholdings. The first earl of Desmond, for example, had an enormous private army, known as the 'rout of MacThomas', that reputedly terrorised much of the south-west in the first half of the fourteenth century. It was a formidable network, and doubtless remaining aloof from it would have been both difficult and perilous. 91 By the 1480s a government report on the size of Desmond's army stated that he had at his disposal 400 horsemen, eight battalions of galloglas warriors, one battalion of crossbowmen and gunners and some 3,000 kern. 92 These disparate confederacies were consolidated by the distribution of livery. The wearing of heraldic insignia can be traced back to the earliest English invaders of Ireland, 93 and in an agreement of 1289 between John fitz Thomas, the future first earl of Kildare, and Peter son of James Bermingham, the latter promised to wear fitz Thomas's robes or livery. 94 The anonymity conferred by the uniform, together with the security naturally found in numbers, often caused 96 and repeated attempts were made by statute to restrict its distribution. 97 It was not until the arrival of Poynings in 1494 that an attempt to proscribe livery was specifically formulated for Ireland. 98 Yet even before this, English statutes (as was not uncommon) seem to have taken practical effect in the colony. In 1490 Henry VII pardoned Kildare 'all infringements of statutes against badges and livery of cloths and caps and retinues'. 99 No doubt livery contributed to the fierce partisanship that led to a ban in 1494 on war-cries in Ireland. It seems that it was the habit of the Geraldine and Butler factions in the late fifteenth century to use war-cries -for instance 'Butler abú!' ('Butler to victory!') -in the course of 'great variances, malices, and debates between divers lords and gentlemen and their retainers'. All such war-cries were therefore abolished, and it was hoped to bring some semblance of unity to the people by insisting that in future they should only invoke St George or the king. evidence is even more abundant. Livery's partner in crime, maintenance, besides having the general meaning of providing for a retainer and protecting him in his disputes, can also refer to supporting a party in litigation illegally. Maintenance, together with two of its subsets, champerty (supporting a suit in return for a share of the profits) and embracery (unduly influencing a jury), were common grievances in this period, and the many attempts to monitor the English judicial system were mirrored in the lordship of Ireland. 102 In the mid-fourteenth century it was said to be impossible to obtain justice because magnates had the lawyers of Ireland in their pockets. 103 The whole issue was tackled head on in the Statute of Kilkenny (1366), chapter VII of which addresses the 'conspiracies, confederacies, champerties, maintainers of suits, false swearers, receivers of damages in suits, [whereby] the liege commons of the said land in pursuit of their rights are much disturbed, aggrieved and disherited'. Those guilty of such abuses were to be punished by fines, so that others 'may be deterred from doing or maintaining so horrible a thing … contrary to law'. 104 This statute did not eradicate the problem, but neither was it merely a parchment law. Large numbers of people sought pardons for these offences. 105 A recurring difficulty was that of extracting accurate information from the juries empanelled in areas dominated by one or other of the great lords. In a dispute that lasted from the late 1360s into the 1370s over the manor of Rathkeale, County Limerick, situated in Desmond territory, the administration specifically stipulated that the facts of the case were to be verified 'by the oath of men who are not allied by kinship to any of the said parties, or to the earl or countess of Dessemund'. 106 It was an effort to avoid embracery. Yet more insidious were charges from the mid-fifteenth century that the White Earl of Ormond gained the Irish parliament's support by making 'Irisshe men and gromes and pages of his housolde knyghtes of the shire'. 107 III 'Lordship' in the late medieval colony, as it emerges from this brief description, is conspicuously akin to that of 'bastard feudal' societies, both in form (for instance the indentures of retinue) and in content (the bestowal of livery and the corruption of justice). Rather than vindicating the colonial nobility, this discussion seems to have confirmed the worst fears of the 'centralist' school. If 442 Irish Historical Studies this is not due to the 'overmightiness' of the magnates, is it attributable to the fact that the king was mostly 'absent and hence permanently "under-mighty"'? 108 This suggestion cannot be lightly dismissed. Even in England, a number of historians have reaffirmed the high level of disorder caused, among other things, by the delegation of peacekeeping functions to self-interested magnates. 109 Yet the debate on this interpretation -which one historian has wryly dubbed 'bastard McFarlanism' 110 -is vigorous. Gerald Harriss has recently emphasised the consensual aspect of English government, reminding us that 'any late medieval government, however developed its central administration, was limited by local particularism … [and] had to rely on local élites who exercised and often appropriated its authority'. 111 Other scholars concur. Each lord had his own 'country', 112 and, although the crown's resources were formidable, they 'were not sufficient to maintain royal authority without a basis of trust between sovereign and subject'. 113 What is true for relatively centralised England can be extended a fortiori to the regionalised Scottish kingdom. In recent studies of Scottish history, what has been called the 'thud-and-blunder approach'
114 to crown-magnate relations has in large part been superseded. Inspired by McFarlane, two scholars in particular, Jenny Wormald and Alexander Grant, have demonstrated the success of delegation to the magnates, who are portrayed as willing partners in 443 the governance of the realm. 115 Even allowing for recent caveats about this 'new orthodoxy', 116 the rehabilitation of the Scottish nobility remains a signal achievement.
The Scottish parallel is particularly pertinent to Ireland, where kinship bonds were also vibrant and noble power was exercised across equally impressive geographical expanses. Robin Frame has concluded that the striking feature of the latter part of Edward III's reign in Ireland was the king's success at working with the grain of colonial society. 117 Of course, not every subsequent monarch was so deft, and there is ample evidence of suspicion and conflict characterising the relationship between crown and nobility in Ireland. 118 But the evidence also points in the contrary direction. Throughout the period nobles of all ranks were called on to perform a range of roles, from offices of local and regional significance, such as commissions of the peace, 119 to the chief governorship. The White Earl of Ormond, for instance, notwithstanding the cries of his detractors, repeatedly served as chief governor (including three times with the illustrious title of lieutenant), often with minimal financial support from England, across nearly half a century from 1407 to 1452. Moreover, despite ministerial complaint about the loss to the exchequer caused by the alienation of regalities, there was 444 Irish Historical Studies no general attack on liberty jurisdiction in the period. 120 Richard II, for one, indulged in 'a new wave of liberty creation', 121 granting the ill-fated earl of Oxford, Robert de Vere, palatine jurisdiction over the whole of Ireland in 1385-6, and engaged in another round during his Irish expedition of 1394-5. 122 Admittedly, these short-lived creations were for Richard's favourites; but the resident nobility was also bolstered. Successive earls of Ormond had their authority nurtured by the king. In 1372 Edward III confirmed the liberty of Tipperary to the heirs of the second earl of Ormond, 123 and in 1392 the government facilitated the Butlers' purchase of the Despenser purparty of Kilkenny. 124 Royal confidence was given public expression through the ceremony of knighthood. James, third earl of Ormond, caught the eye of the Westminster chronicler when he 'received the belt of knighthood' from Richard II in the Westminster parliament of November 1385. 125 His grandson, James, the fifth earl, was likewise dubbed by Henry VI in 1426. Shrewd marriage policies gave him entry into English county society, and in 1449 he was granted the earldom of Wiltshire. The advent of the Yorkist dynasty stalled the family's remarkable advance; but ironically, the earl's execution in 1461 was bloody proof of the Butlers' hitherto extraordinary success.
If the intimacy of the Butlers' relationship with England was unusual, the benefits accruing from royal support were not. The basis of the much-vaunted Kildare ascendancy was laid by Henry VI about 1454, when he rescued the earldom of Kildare from oblivion by recognising Thomas fitz Maurice, grandnephew of the fifth earl, as seventh earl. A century earlier Edward III saved the earldom of Desmond from a similar fate, after Maurice, the second earl, drowned in the Irish Sea, leaving as heir an idiot brother. The Geraldine inheritance was transferred to his younger brother, Gerald, whose career as third earl of Desmond provided a focus for English lordship in the south-west during four very challenging decades. The bond between Munster and court may have been weaker in the fifteenth century, but it was resilient enough to enable Thomas, eighth earl of Desmond, to re-emerge as chief governor after the Geraldines defeated the Butlers at Piltown in 1462. Against this background, the assault on noble interests in 1468 by the chief governor, John Tiptoft, earl of Worcesterresulting in the attainder of Kildare and the execution of Desmond -appears as an appalling miscalculation. 126 Richard III was later to state as much, when he attempted to woo James, ninth earl of Desmond, by recalling the 'manyfold notable service and kyndnesse' of his father, who had been 'extorciously slayne and murdred'. 127 What was irksome to the king was not the power that nobles exercised, but abuse of it. Private armies were not condemned, so long as they were restricted to frontier zones and prevented from exacting money and food in the more settled areas of the colony. 128 Lords operating in these areas could distribute livery so long as they provided the government with the names of their retainers. 129 Nor, indeed, did magnate 'abuses' differ appreciably from the practices of many royal appointees. The hysteria aroused by the 'rout' of the first earl of Desmond is echoed in the charges levelled against the controversial chief governor, Sir William Windsor, whose retinue was described by the Irish Commons as a 'grant route'. 130 Windsor's chief governorship also provides the clearest example of an attempt to manipulate the outcome of parliamentary elections. 131 Clearly 'overmightiness' was in the eye of the beholder. The core fact is that an absence of lords, and therefore of lordship, was a far more likely to lead to crisis than 'overweening' aristocratic power. A Gaelic annalist acknowledged this fact when he remarked laconically upon the death of the third earl of Ormond in 1405 that 'the Galls were very powerless after that'. 132 
IV
This background is vital to an understanding of the issue of factionalism in Ireland, because it exposes as both antique and a fraud the familiar portrait of an 446 Irish Historical Studies enervated central authority unable to restrain the excesses of the magnates. Vibrancy, rather than frailty, is often the conspicuous characteristic of the tissue connecting 'court' and 'country', and it was by capitalising on these connexions that fortunes were advanced. Of course, there were conflicts, which had local causes. Land is an obvious example. It was the confiscation of the White Earl of Ormond's estates in 1417 by the then lieutenant, John Talbot, that inaugurated several decades of strife between the two. 133 The jurisdictional privileges of the magnates were also jealously guarded: Earl James II of Ormond struggled during the 1350s to exercise his palatine rights as lord of Tipperary over the manors of Kilfeakle, Kilsheelan and the town of Clonmel, which had been purchased by the first earl of Desmond. 134 If territorial and judicial lordship were two common sources of dispute, lordship over men was another. In the litany of accusations against Talbot sent to court by the White Earl of Ormond in 1422, the grievances of the extended Butler affinity predominate, including Ormond's kinsmen, knights and esquires, his chaplain, a councillor and the constable of Knocktopher castle, as well as the bondsmen, tenants, burgesses and religious foundations under his protection. Honour, prestige and chivalric sensibilities might also be offended. 135 When, for example, the White Earl was accused of being too 'aged, unwiledie and unlustie' to hold office, he countered the charges with an offer to defend himself against his detractors personally in battle. 136 But if private considerations sparked conflict, the best means of promoting one's interests was to utilise the apparatus of central government.
Competition for high office was intense, as is clear from the many surviving petitions and counter-petitions that trumpet the virtues of one party and decry the excesses of another, all with the hope of shaking the king's confidence, showing up rivals as unfit for office, and hopefully winning commissions. 137 What tangible advantages then, beyond honour and prestige, were bestowed by the office of chief governor? For one thing, it provided the incumbent with an enormous extension of his normal seigneurial power and jurisdiction, the physical expression of which was control of the king's castles and ordnance. Against enemies, that authority could be wielded punitively, and many documents report that complainants voiced their grievances only with trepidation. 138 Rivals faced punitive amercements and troublesome judicial inquiries; their lands might be subjected to purveyance, their debts and accounts to embarrassing scrutiny, and payments of arrears due to them might be endlessly deferred. If the power inherent in the office could inspire dread, for friends, family and well-wishers it could also be turned to constructive use. An impressive repertory of patronage lay at the chief governor's disposal. Lands, cash sums, wardships, marriages, letters of protection, appointments in the central and local administration, and ecclesiastical benefices: all were distributed to satiate the demands of followers and bolster local influence.
These machinations are keenly associated with the 'Talbot-Ormond struggle' of the mid-fifteenth century, and may seem a stark contrast to the later fourteenth century, when historians have emphasised the nobility's anxiety to avoid official duties. 139 Certainly the chief governorship was onerous. 140 Yet we should not exaggerate its ill effects. High office was always a privilege and a predicament: the art lay in ensuring that the burdens never outweighed the perquisites. 141 Moreover, many of the more 'dismaying' features associated with the fifteenthcentury polity were visible well before 1400. Even when the colony's magnates were not scrambling for office, factionalism found expression in the lordship's politics, often in the form of courting the favour of the latest appointee to the chief governorship. The second earl of Ormond's proximity to Edward III's son, Lionel of Antwerp, for instance, enabled him to promote his private concerns to the detriment of the Geraldines of Munster. 142 Not every chief governor was willing to become a pawn in the power struggles of the resident nobility, but such men had to be wary since the colony had well-tried means of destroying the reputations of the intractable. Two centuries before Tudor administrators were discovering that the response of the Irish nobility to their reform initiatives was dictated not by inborn distrust of royal government, but by what Ciaran Brady calls the 'complex and delicate calculus of faction', 143 many a minister in late medieval Ireland had learned to his cost that colonial attitudes were dictated in large part by political alignments. Grievance-laden delegations, often purporting to speak with the authority of the Irish parliament, were a familiar sight at Westminster from at least the mid-fourteenth century. The formulaic complaints often barely disguised a political agenda. 144 As a result, officials became acutely sensitive to the hazards of their office and sought to have all imputations made at court returned to the Irish chancery for investigation, so that false accusers could be punished as 'a warning to others to abstain from such things'. 145 Cannier still were those who pre-empted their detractors by securing promises that allegations would be dealt with by the king personally. 146 This atmosphere of vigorous politicking was underpinned by an awareness of the mores of English political life. Documents such as Magna Carta and the Modus tenendi parliamentum were used as sticks to beat more than one chief governor between the mid-fourteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. 147 In 1420, to inaugurate his first lieutenancy of Ireland, the White Earl of Ormond commissioned a translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian tract, Secreta secretorum. 148 The translator, James Yonge, drew extensively on William Langland, whose works had found an audience in Ireland since at least the 1390s and were being copied and illustrated in the colony in the early fifteenth century. 149 Yonge's edition, entitled The governaunce of prynces, is dedicated to 'Iamys de Botillere, Erle of Ormonde, lieutenaunt of oure lege lorde, kynge henry the fyfte in Irland'. 150 Grand words indeed, but not mere affectation. If constitutional sensitivities coincided conveniently with private objectives, this was hardly an Irish phenomenon. 151 It seems excessively negative to interpret the nobility's involvement in the administration as 'magnate dominance' leading to the 'crown's paralysis in Ireland'. 152 Rather, it demonstrates the ongoing relevance of English institutions. Even the most dramatic rejections of metropolitan authority -the famous parliamentary declaration of 1460 and the crowning of 'Edward VI' in 1487 as king (not lord) of Ireland -occurred precisely because of the entanglement of Ireland in English politics, and are indicative of a highly articulate and self-confident political culture in the colony.
There is a danger of protesting too much on this point and nurturing a 'counterlegend', perhaps one in which the colony's nobility become toothless politicos. 153 They could also be bellicose. Statistical analysis might 'prove' that Ireland was no worse than England in that regard. The battle of Piltown in 1462 brings to a grand total of one the number of pitched battles in the lordship in the fifteenth century. Such comparisons are, however, likely to founder on the fact that conflicts in Ireland, as in Scotland, were highly localised and therefore less likely to be revealed in the records. 154 More tellingly, Ireland bristled with petty fortifications, and warfare usually followed an inconclusive pattern of raids, sieges and ransoming 155 of a kind that was alien to most of England, where strongpoints were few and pitched battles could be decisive. What is significant is that in neither case was violence 'pathological'; rather, it was 'normal and inevitable as people struggled to secure their objectives'. 156 Even the fiercest rivalries had limitations, and avenues towards composition were rarely totally blocked.
Recent work on private peacemaking in Britain should dispel any assumption that arbitration -common as it was in Gaelic Ireland 157 -was a deviation from English norms or signified a breakdown in the 'rule of law'. Arbitration was popular because it was swifter, less expensive, and usually more likely to provide a satisfactory outcome than adversarial litigation. 158 To facilitate the process of settlement, standing arrangements might be drawn up for the election of panels of negotiators. 159 Venues for mediation seem to have been selected carefully. During the 1380s repeated arbitrations were held at Clonmel between the Munster Geraldines and the Butlers. 160 Clonmel was a Geraldine town lying within the Butler liberty of Tipperary and was therefore relatively neutral ground.
Its employment in this respect is reminiscent of the 'days of the march' held to compose quarrels on the boundaries of lordships in the march of Wales. 161 Sometimes the restoration of peace required royal intervention; but often the peacemakers were resident nobles. Their power was more immediate than that of the king, and the threat of physical coercion could encourage antagonists to lay aside their 'ill-will … [and] establish good accord'. 162 According to the earl of Desmond, writing in 1491, only the personal presence of the Great Earl of Kildare could prevent 'mortale werre and grete scheding of Cristyn blode' with the Burkes of Clanricard, 'for we ben bound and sworn to abide his rule and jugement in this wariens aforsaid'. 163 Spiritual lords wielded weapons of a different type, but their ability to compel adherence to a settlement with threats of 'suspension, excommunication, and interdict' 164 should not be lightly discounted. 165 The disputants might be further bound by the drawing up of a document, often in the form of an indenture, the terms of which both parties swore to observe before witnesses and sometimes upon holy relics or a 'Masse boke'. 166 Despite attempts to prevent a breakdown of consensus, not every arbitration could boast lasting results. 167 One way of increasing the likelihood of settlement was to fuse the combatants' bloodlines with a marriage settlement. 168 A papal dispensation of 1447 expressed the high hope that one such union, between the earls of Desmond and the lords of Kerry, would allay the 'great wars … whence slaughter, burnings of towns and castles, depopulation, etc. have been perpetrated and are perpetrated daily, so that there seems to be no hope of peace'. 169 Of course, marriages were motivated by many considerations, and where the impulse was political or strategic rather than palliative, they had the potential to disrupt. The fourth earl of Ormond's marriage in 1432 to the daughter of the ailing fifth earl of Kildare was a personal coup in that, despite an entail of 1397, it brought him control of the Kildare inheritance by right of his wife; however, a side-effect was the hostility it aroused among the Geraldines of Kildare which was to last for over a century. 170 Even when the desire to bring harmony to discordant relations was genuine, matrimonial bliss -in a wider sense -was difficult to achieve, not least because of the unforeseen ramifications of any union. The Talbot-Ormond acrimony was brought to an end about 1444 when the White Earl's daughter, Elizabeth, was married to Talbot's heir and namesake, Sir John. 171 Unfortunately Ormond had a previous arrangement dating from 1429 with the earl of Desmond, whereby the children of the two earls were betrothed to each other. 172 Marriageable personnel were a coveted and finite resource, and it may have been the denial to the Geraldines of a spouse that brought an end to several decades of détente and sparked Desmond's raid deep into Butler territory in 1444. 173 Notwithstanding their inadequacies, these forms of dispute resolution spun a web of affiliations that was far more complex than can be comprehended by adjectives such as 'hostile' and 'antagonistic'. The paradox of the 'peace in the feud' 174 has become relatively familiar, owing to the enthusiasm with which historians studying diverse regions and periods have embraced the ideas of sociologists and anthropologists studying feuding societies. 175 Such theories may soon begin to lead the facts if they are not treated gingerly; but lessons from anthropology can help us appreciate the intricacy of social networks. As Max Gluckman put it, 'people who are friends on one basis are enemies on another [wherein] lies social cohesion, rooted in the conflicts between men's different allegiances'. 176 The best means of entry to this complex world is to examine one particular case. By a nuptial settlement of 1359, the daughter of Earl James II of Ormond was wedded to Gerald, third earl of Desmond. 177 Consequently, when James III Butler succeeded his father as earl in 1382, the man with whom he found himself repeatedly at odds was, in fact, his brother-in-law. Matters became further entangled by the notorious liaison of Earl James III with his niece, Katherine, daughter of the third earl of Desmond. By 1402 Katherine had borne her uncle four sons. 178 Three of them were graced with traditional Butler names 452
Irish Historical Studies
-James, Edmund and Theobald -but the other son was named Gerald, commemorating innumerable Geraldine forebears stretching back to Gerald of Windsor. As one family connexion was being forged, another was broken. In 1392 the Gaelic annals report that the 'countess of Desmond … a bountiful and truly hospitable woman, died after the victory of Penance'. As the annalist noted, she was the 'daughter of the [second] earl of Ormond'. 179 Perhaps this loss inclined the third earl of Ormond to sympathise with his Geraldine relatives. It was early in 1393 that Ormond expressed some affection for his sister's progeny, calling the future fourth earl of Desmond, 'notre treschere et tresame neveu Johan de Dessemond'. 180 Such diplomatic courtesies may, of course, be little more than a veneer, thinly disguising a contempt bred on a diet of long familiarity. Yet they also serve to show how intertwined, even incestuous, the two families were, and the resultant 'conflicts of loyalties' 181 could propel antagonists towards peace. In the 1380s the discords between the Geraldines and Butlers had been composed, however transiently, at the arbitration table.
182 When the conflict broke out again in the 1390s, it was markedly more intense. In 1396 Thomas Butler, Earl James III's brother, was slain at Waterford by the Geraldines. Faced with reprisals from Ormond, the third earl of Desmond agreed to pay some eight hundred marks in compensation. 183 Later, during Richard II's expedition to Ireland of 1399, Ormond reputedly encouraged the king's men to expel the Geraldines from Dungarvan castle. John, fourth earl of Desmond, retaliated with an attack on the Butler stronghold of Cahir. Uncle and nephew, Ormond and Desmond, came to terms and made peace. By mischance, Desmond was drowned in the river Suir near Ardfinnan while returning from the settlement. 184 Violence may seem to dominate this social intercourse, but in fact many classic features of a private conflict leading to conciliation are on display. Border tension, murder and reprisals are counterpoised by marriage alliances, arbitration, peace treaties and compensation. V This cursory overview of so broad a theme has, in many ways, been more an exercise in unfolding ignorance than supplying answers. Nor does the year 1496 453 mark an end to the story. Despite the impetus towards peace, so long as two powers remained in physical proximity, rubbing each other up the wrong way so to speak, friction was certain to arise. Yet if the antagonisms endured, so did the factors limiting violence and pushing conflict into more political arenas, the Irish parliament or the English court to name but two. That conclusion may seem unsatisfactory, but it reflects the uncertainty surrounding many attempts at dispute resolution. Recognition of this precarious balance should be a startingpoint for any study of noble power in late medieval Ireland, for it is in the nuances and incongruities that the fascination of the topic lies. Richard Stanihurst made the point well in one of his most famous tales about the escapades of the great earl of Kildare. The year was 1492, the setting, Dublin. 185 Sir James of Ormond, deputy to the earl of Ormond in Ireland, fearing that his life was threatened by a mob of Kildare supporters, took refuge from the Dublin rabble in the chapter house of St Patrick's cathedral. The Great Earl himself followed him there and guaranteed his safety if he came out. A hole was cut in the chapter house door so that the two men might shake hands as an assurance of Kildare's goodwill. Sir James understandably suspected treachery and refused to pass his hand through the chink in the door in case it was hacked off by a Geraldine zealot. So it was that Kildare, literally, chanced his arm. To use Stanihurst's words: 'Kildare stretcht in his hand to him, and so the dore was opened, they both embraced, the storme appeased, and all their quarrels for that presente, rather discontinued than ended.' 186 
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